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After the crisis
GDP growth has been positive this year; Spanish income per capita
is increasing by 1% in real terms, and perspectives point towards
steady growth: there is reason to believe that we are out of the
crisis! We are in 2014, seven years after that fateful 9 August in
which monetary authorities rang the alarm bells announcing the
end of the real estate boom in the United States almost one decade
after the first warnings. The crisis has been long.
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A world in crisis
The beginning of the crisis was the worst
time: spoiled by a decade of uninterrupted
growth, misled by an official discourse stub-
bornly denying the evidence, we entered the
crisis with that feeling of fear instilled by the
unknown. As things were moving and the
horizon did not clear, we focused our vision in
order to find our way amidst the dark. Fear
gave way to a more lucid view of things, nei-
ther optimistic nor pessimistic. And so we
went our way till we got here.
The crisis forced us to correct some
persistent imbalance we had been
unable to tackle as long as
circumstances were favourable:
average debt of Spanish families,
external imbalance and stagnation
of the economy.
Figures give an idea of the size of adjustment:
in 2007, almost 14% of the working popula-
tion in Spain was employed in building. Seven
years after, the figure has been left at slightly
above the European 5.8% average: almost one
million and a half jobs have disappeared from
the industry this year. No such movement had
been seen since the times of transition to
democracy, between 1975 and 1985, when
three million jobs were lost in agriculture.
Compared with the eurozone average, our liv-
ing standard declined from 95% to 80%
within one decade, a gap comparable to 1990.
Also, the crisis forced us to correct some per-
sistent imbalance we had been unable to
tackle as long as circumstances were
favourable: average debt of Spanish families,
which had reached 128% of the available
income in 2007, is back to roughly 60%; exter-
nal imbalance, measured by a current account
deficit proportionately higher than that of the
United States in 2007, has been reduced to
less than a quarter; and stagnation of the
economy, measured by the volume of bank
liabilities as of GDP, went down from almost
four to less than three times, a proportion
comparable to the European average.
Each figure summarises a very costly adjust-
ment process, hiding fear and suffering that
was sometimes at the verge of tearing our
social fabric apart, so it is indispensable to act
in a way such processes do not become neces-
sary ever again as they were this time. A good
way of learning the lesson out of the crisis is
to remind its most relevant features.1
Recovery of the banking
sector
Less than two years had passed since the out-
break of the crisis, when authorities decided
to tackle the problem of credit restriction that
was ravaging the whole economy. The prob-
lem was general, probably more in countries
like the United States, the United Kingdom
and Ireland than in Spain, but widespread
enough to threaten growth in all big
economies. The origin of the problem was well
known: the balance sheets of banks were fea-
turing assets almost impossible to assess,
which set an end to the credit flow between
banks; ongoing liquidity injections by Euro-
pean and American monetary authorities had
served as safety reserves for banks, not as a
basis to extend credit; and this lack of financ-
ing was being felt in companies, not only
related to resources for new investment proj-
ects but even to fund their current operations.
Recovery of the sector was necessary as its sit-
uation was becoming worse with time.
The core problem was assessment of dubious
assets: a too high price meant a higher sub-
sidy the more carelessly the bank had
behaved, while a too low price could cause
default of banks that would otherwise be sol-
vent under normal market conditions. Thus
purchasing price fixation determined to a large
extent the configuration of the recovered
finance sector.
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Considering that the banking crisis of the
1990s had turned the Spanish banking system
into one of the most efficient in its region and
the US experience was not recommending
excessive concentration in the branch, author-
ities decided to keep the existing structure by
and large, with only some minor changes,
both regulatory and in the shape of mergers,
between smaller local banks.
At international level, Spanish authorities
gave support to some EU initiatives aimed at
limiting growth of banks. These initiatives
were very controversial as they had not
yielded concrete results even years after. Dubi-
ous assets were acquired by a public body
specifically created for that purpose, in charge
of managing them until market conditions
would recommend their sale. Few years later,
most of these assets had been sold, sometimes
at a surplus, others at a slight loss.
The balance sheets of banks were
featuring assets almost impossible
to assess, which set an end to the
credit flow between banks.
Recovery of the sector was
necessary.
Once the sector had been recovered, it was
possible to establish the capitalisation needs
of banks. These needs were partly covered
with private investors, partly with public
funds; in the case of the latter, regional and
local authorities had the occasion of partici-
pating in recovering those banks they consid-
ered useful within their scope of action. The
increase of public debt in compensation for
acquiring assets and capitalisation operations
posed an additional burden on budgets, yet
without placing public accounts beyond the
limits set by the European Union.
All this process was lengthy and costly, but it
can be said that its outcome has lived up to
expectations. After all, the banking sector, the
vehicle and main player, if not the driver of
the crisis, is the one having undergone less
change in both its structure and process.
Once the sector had been
recovered, it was possible to
establish the capitalisation needs of
banks, partly covered with private
investors, partly with public funds.
The cost of the crisis
The biggest cost of any crisis is always job
destruction: unemployment is the variable
featuring a negative development for the
longest time – the average length of crises in
advanced countries has been five years in the
last half century – and this crisis has not been
an exception to it: the unemployment rate
increased by 60% in the first year, reaching
14% in late 2008. The facts proved official
forecasts wrong, and unemployment contin-
ued growing till reaching four million jobless
in late 2009 before arriving to a peak 19% (4.4
million unemployed) towards the end of the
second half of 2010. However, the psychologi-
cal effects of unemployment were especially
felt in the third quarter of 2009, when a new
year was about to begin without any perspec-
tive of improvement.
From that moment, several circumstances
turned the situation more bearable: on the
one hand, tax policy measures initiated by
authorities yielded the first visible results,
especially in the building branch in municipal-
ities most affected by unemployment; sec-
ondly, normalisation of the credit flow
allowed companies to take up their usual
activity; the feeling of blatant pessimism that
had been predominant until then faded away;
and those unemployed started thinking that
their situation could change soon. This change
of mind was felt in private consumption,
which had suffered a dramatic fall already in
early 2008 and had not recovered in the fol-
lowing eighteen months.
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The biggest cost of any crisis is
always job destruction:
unemployment is the variable
featuring a negative development
for the longest time.
Finally, reforms forced by the crisis managed
to stimulate the creation of new jobs despite
not halting the increase of unemployment:
thus the labour market recovered its
dynamism and it became apparent that as
jobs were destroyed, others were created.
Also, the government was extending unem-
ployment benefits but subject, in the case of
workers under 40, to registration for training
courses and acceptance of job offers appro-
priate for their skills. The situation in the
labour market had become so tough in
autumn 2009 that employees and companies
were forced to drive reform that would not
have been possible under different circum-
stances.
Employers’ organisations and trade unions
reached agreements aimed at adapting the
situation of newly hired to long-standing
employees, thus mitigating the extreme tem-
porality rate of younger workers: the most
common argument to convince older employ-
ees was that they simply could contribute to
create better labour conditions for their chil-
dren accepting a bit of flexibility for them-
selves.2 They also agreed on freezing salaries
in exchange for commitment to employment
stability. These agreements had to be ratified
by each company and did not apply to the
building industry. Generally speaking, it was
left to the companies to agree the salary for-
mula, working time and job stability they
considered bearable, for in the second half of
2009, latent conflict was such that it was
often preferable for the entrepreneur to go
bankrupt than to tackle layoff, so there was
no danger that a company would dare to
think of big employment regulation.
The most notable change took place in the
local area, in factories and workshops, in
warehouses, offices and shops. Faced with
unemployment without an immediate
 perspective of finding a new job, employees
accepted salary cuts and working time
increases; absenteeism went down to 20% of
its value from good times like magic – this fall
is to be attributed to a change in attitude of
workers and unions.3 In some very localised
cases, workers, especially elderly female
employees, left their job voluntarily to
younger people so they could acquire experi-
ence and not be left idle.4
Entrepreneurs in their turn, given the per-
spective of worse labour conflict than in times
of democratic transition, were readier to
accept part-time work modes (it came them
cheaper than creating kindergartens for their
employees’ children); they committed to
devote a part of savings achieved through
improved productivity to training, improving
its quality and scope; and they accepted a
temporary charge on corporate tax to fund a
part of the public debt increase resulting from
extending unemployment benefit.
Employees and companies were
forced to drive reform that would
not have been possible under
different circumstances.
If the efforts by all sides were aimed at
 preventing job destruction – except in the
building industry – in the initial stage of the
crisis, the problem shifted to finding new
jobs for the unemployed as time was passing,
which necessarily required training in other
areas.
The results were different from expectations,
with some surprise: even with some differ-
ence according to the nationality, migrants –
fears about which were difficulty in finding
jobs for them, thus becoming a potential
source of conflict – found jobs easily for two
reasons: they were relatively young and had
often been overqualified for the tasks they
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had been doing. It can be said that integra-
tion of most migrant communities has been
a success. Further, groups of young natives
that had often dropped off school and
been lingering with occasional jobs in
good times were now very difficult to hire
and their retraining required efforts by many
authorities.
Migrants found jobs easily for two
reasons: they were relatively young
and had often been overqualified for
the tasks they had been doing.
Like all restructuring processes, one part of
those unemployed due to the crisis lost their
job for ever. Most of them were not in the
building branch but in the industry, which
underwent its own restructuring: credit
 freezing first, followed by a decline in both
domestic and foreign demand was the cause of
big layoffs, concentrated in the building supply
industry, tourism and car making. During the
first months of the crisis, when job destruction
was more intense, it was even thought – and
sometimes published – that the whole Spanish
industry was doomed to disappear.
However, things had changed by mid-2010,
partly thanks to credit being restored and
because measures adopted by companies
to tackle the crisis were starting to be
 successful. There were victims in all branches,
but all branches also had their winners; as
occurred with industrial restructuring in the
1980s, there is no doubt that the Spanish
economy came out of this crisis with renewed
strength.
Some civil institutions had the
capacity to funnel these fears and
turn them into useful activity, moved
by a very simple idea: convincing
the population that the crisis
mattered everybody.
Conclusion
It is impossible to give an idea of how the
crisis developed in such little space. Behind
each change, each agreement, each figure
there are efforts, confrontation, frustration,
often dramatic stories. Toward mid-2009,
fears of social breakdown authorities were
absolutely unable to contain was perceivable.
Fortunately, some civil institutions had the
capacity to funnel these fears and turn them
into useful activity, moved by a very simple
idea: convincing the population that the
 crisis mattered everybody. On the one hand,
the number of extremely poor people
increased rapidly: accommodation centres
were beyond their capacities one year after
the crisis had broken out. On the other, those
aware that the crisis was frustrating the hope
of many expecting to escape from poverty
and give a better future to their children
knew that it was necessary to help them
endure those bad years without depleting
their skills nor personal, family and labour
relations. This recent hidden poverty was
more numerous than the visible one and
had more destructive effects on the social
fabric.
Behind each change, each
agreement, each figure there are
efforts, confrontation, frustration,
often dramatic stories.
As the effects of the crisis were spreading,
all sorts of initiatives proliferated: organisa-
tions to support families without resources,
providing them with accommodation and
food and allowing their children to continue
attending school; there was an increase in
donations by companies and especially indi-
viduals; groups caring for the poor and
homeless sprouted, often assisted by young
people and students who, feeling that what
separated them from the worse-off was
rather sheer luck than their own merit, were
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concerned about people they perhaps had
never before looked at. All institutions
took part in this movement: chambers of
commerce, universities and schools, religious
and lay organisations, sports organisations.
They all gave each other the feeling that
everybody mattered and the barriers
 separating all different classes, communities,
quarters and tribes making a society had
disappeared for one moment.5 To some, this
has been the most valuable memory of
these years.
They all gave each other the feeling
that everybody mattered and the
barriers separating all different
classes, communities, quarters
and tribes making a society had
disappeared for one moment.
If it is true, as we believe, that we are leaving
the crisis behind, this is the time to draw a
conclusion from it, to learn the lesson that
perhaps may help us prevent another one.
Of course, everybody will have drawn theirs.
However, it is useful to point out three that
can be of general interest.
The first, the simplest point relates to our
economy: we need once for all to learn the
lesson given by Keynes more than seventy
years ago and stubbornly forgotten that a
market economy like ours is potentially
unstable. Such instability is due to the
natural evolution of the financial system,
which renders appropriate regulation indis-
pensable. Besides, the recent crisis has told us
that it is better to bear inefficiency of excess
regulation than the cost of a crisis caused by a
lack of it.
Keynes said more than seventy
years ago that a market economy
like ours is potentially unstable due
to the natural evolution of the
financial system.
The second stems from the way our companies,
our employees and our society reacted against
the crisis and adapted to survive. This episode
has taught us to once again trust our forces,
while it has reminded us that well done work
is more than just a curse and one feels better
living in a more integrated, even almost frater-
nal society.
The third point is perhaps the most important.
In the years prior to the crisis we had seen our
way of living together deteriorate. Also,
improvement of human relations achieved
during the crisis has been first and foremost
the result of fear. And we need to admit that
fear, like greed, cannot be a solid foundation
of living together. As fear passes, we are at
risk of getting back to the starting point unless
we find a foundation on which to patiently
create the social fabric.
Considering where we are coming
from, we need to set altruism as a
starting point for the task of
reconstructing a modest but solid
base. Being altruistic does not mean
to despise money; it is to have the
desire of doing things for the
common interest.
Let us not feel tempted to put the cart before
the horse by invoking those great virtues dis-
tance and lack of practice have turned an
abstraction: we are a very diverse society
where everybody believes they have a right to
have a say, thus leaving the wish of imposing
an idea futile, no matter how good this idea
may be. Perhaps it is more realistic, consider-
ing where we are coming from, to set altruism
as a starting point for the task of reconstructing
a modest but solid base. Being altruistic does
not mean to despise money; it is to have the
desire of doing things for the common inter-
est as an essential driving force. When this
desire is predominant, there is order;
 otherwise  disorder is created. Everybody has
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had the occasion during this crisis of person-
ally experiencing the beneficial influence of
altruism and seeing its action in the others.
Being altruistic is within everybody’s grasp:
it does not contradict any belief or conviction.
Let us start then here in order to make
sure that the necessary calm feeds higher
aspirations.
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Notes
1. I will omit any mention to political change caused by the crisis as it is well known by everybody.
2. In practice, the first steps to standardise labour contracts based on a single open-ended contract were made, with agreed compensa-
tion according to years of service; portability of service years was also established to make mobility between jobs and companies more
attractive.
3. The decline in the number and frequency of leaves due to depression was notorious.
4. A similar experiment had been done in a German industrial city in the 1990s.
5. As a collateral phenomenon, it was observed that the relations between the government and the Catholic church became less bel-
ligerent.
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